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Impact Statements
I. Introduction
The New York State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA)1 requires that an environmental impact statement
(EIS) be prepared for any action which may have a significant
effect on the environment.2 The EIS provides detailed infor-
mation which is utilized by the reviewing agency in forming
the basis for an informed decision on whether or not to under-
take or approve an action.'
Judicial review in determining whether an EIS is suffi-
ciently substantive involves a two part process. First, the ap-
propriate standard of judicial review is established. Second,
the EIS is reviewed against the applicable judicial standard to
determine whether the provided information is sufficient to
justify the agency's determination.
In Jackson v. New York State Urban Development
Corp., the New York Court of Appeals used the "arbitrary
and capricious" 5 standard of review, and found that the speci-
ficity of the environmental quality data presented in the EIS
for the Times Square area development project was sufficient
because it had allowed public comment and consideration.
This note will review the supreme court's, the appellate divi-
sion's, and the court of appeal's determination of the appro-
priate standard of review, and the three courts' determination
of the sufficiency of the EIS based on this standard.
1. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
2. Id. § 8-0109(2).
3. Id.
4. 67 N.Y.2d 400, 494 N.E.2d 429, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1986).
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1981).
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II. Background
SEQRA was enacted in 1975 in an effort to balance the
social and economic goals of an action6 proposed by a state or
local agency against its environmental costs. In accordance
with SEQRA, an EIS must be prepared by the applicant or
the reviewing agency for any action that may have a signifi-
cant effect on the environment.7 If the responsible agency
makes an initial determination that the action may signifi-
cantly affect the environment, it prepares a draft environmen-
tal impact statement (DEIS).' The purpose of a DEIS is "to
relate environmental considerations to the inception of the
planning process, to inform the public and other public agen-
cies as early as possible about the proposed actions that may
significantly affect the quality of the environment, and to so-
licit comments which will assist the agency in the decision
making process."9 The final environmental impact statement
(FEIS), which reflects the public comments, is subsequently
prepared by the agency. 10
SEQRA requires the preparer of eacl EIS to include, in
part, a detailed statement setting forth the environmental im-
pact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
and alternatives to the proposed action.11 The EIS should be
recognized as "not merely a disclosure statement but rather as
an aid in an agency's decision making process to evaluate and
6. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0105(4) (McKinney 1984). Actions are defined to
include:
(i) projects or activities directly undertaken by any [state or local] agency; or
projects or activities supported in whole or part through contracts, grants,
subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assistance from one or more agen-
cies; or projects or activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease,
permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act by
one or more agencies; (ii) policy, regulations, and procedure-making.
Id.
7. Id. § 8-0109(2).
8. Id. § 8-0109(4).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 8-0109(5).
11. Id. § 8-0109(2).
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balance the competing factors."'" To facilitate the decision
making process, the "EIS's shall be clearly and concisely writ-
ten in plain language that can be read and understood by the
public."" The EIS should be analytical but not encyclope-
dic.1" Highly technical material should be summarized. 15 The
degree to which an environmental impact must be presented
will vary with the circumstances and nature of each propo-
sal.16 The extent of detail required must necessarily be related
to the complexity of the environmental problems created by
the project.' 7 The rule of reasonableness and balance is to be
utilized in determining the sufficiency of the degree to which
an environmental impact has been discussed.'"
The New York State Administrative Procedure Act dic-
tates that judicial reviews of agency determinations will be
conducted in the manner provided by Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).'9 In reviewing an
administrative agency's actions, the court will overturn a de-
termination only if it is found to be arbitrary and capricious
or unsupported by substantial evidence.20 The agency's record
must show that it identified the relevant areas of environmen-
tal concern, took a "hard look" at the environmental conse-
quences, and made a reasonable elaboration of the basis for
12. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 222,
430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446 (4th Dep't 1980).
13. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.14(c) (1987).
14. Id. § 617.14(b).
15. Id. § 617.14(c).
16. Webster Assoc. v. Town of Webster, 59 N.Y.2d 220, 228, 464 N.Y.S.2d 431,
434 (1983).
17. Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 224,
430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 448 (4th Dep't 1980) (citing Iowa Citizens for Envtl. Quality v.
Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 52 (8th Cir. 1973)).
18. Coalition Against Lincoln West, Inc. v. City of New York, 94 A.D.2d 483, 491,
465 N.Y.S.2d 170, 176 (1st Dep't 1983).
19. N.Y. A.P.A. § 204(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
On petition of any person, an agency may issue a declaratory ruling with
respect to (i) the applicability to any person, property, or state of facts of any
rule or statute enforceable by it ... A declaratory ruling shall be subject to
review in the manner provided for in article seventy-eight of civil practice
law and rules.
Id.
20. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1981).
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its determination.2 ' The court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. 22 The agency's determination is ac-
corded great weight, especially where the determination in-
volves specialized, scientific knowledge.23
III. Jackson v. New York State Urban Development Corp.
A. The Facts and the New York Supreme Court Decision
The New York State Urban Development Corporation
(UDC) 24 is the co-sponsor and lead agency for the Times
Square area development project.25 The goals of the UDC de-
velopment plan are the elimination of area blight, revitaliza-
tion of the area as an entertainment center, and the develop-'
ment of commercial potential.2 6 In an effort to achieve these
goals, the UDC prepared a DEIS supporting the development
of four office towers, a hotel, theaters, retail and restaurant
space and a wholesale mart in the project area. In February
1984, the UDC circulated the DEIS to agencies having an in-
terest in the proposed action and made it available for public
21. H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 232, 418
N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (4th Dep't 1979) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410
n.21 (1976)). The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a "hard
look" at environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of dis-
cretion of the executive as to the choice of action taken. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22. New York Water Serv. Corp. v. Water Power & Control Comm'n, 257 A.D.
590, 594, 13 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764 (3d Dep't 1939).
23. Town of Hempstead v. Flacke, 82 A.D.2d 183, 187-88, 441 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490
(2d Dep't 1981).
24. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 6252 (McKinney 1984). In 1968, the New York State
Urban Development Corporation Act was enacted for the express purposes of pro-
moting a vigorous and growing economy, ameliorating blighted and deteriorating ar-
eas throughout New York, and supplying adequate and safe dwelling accommoda-
tions for families of low income. To achieve these purposes, the UDC, a corporate
governmental agency, was created. Id.
25. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13,
col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County). The portion of the Times Square area of Man-
hattan within the scope of the development plan encompasses 41st Street to 43rd
Street, from Eighth Avenue to Broadway. Id.
26. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 411, 494
N.E.2d 429, 432, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301 (1986).
27. Id. at 412, 494 N.E.2d at 432, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02.
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comment. 28 Pursuant to SEQRA,29 the UDC conducted public
hearings on the environmental impacts of the proposed devel-
opment project on March 26, 1984 and April 9, 1984.0 After
reviewing the comments raised during the public hearings, the
UDC issued the FEIS on August 23, 1984.1
Jackson is a consolidation of four proceedings brought
against the UDC in December 1984 and early 1985 by two
groups of petitioners.12 The Rosenthal petitioners include en-
tities which own or rent Times Square area buildings that are
slated to be acquired by the UDC and demolished, and people
who work or own businesses in the project area.3 3 The Rosen-
thal petitioners claim, in part, that the FEIS did not ade-
quately address the impact of the project on the area's traffic
and air quality.34
The majority of the Rosenthal petitioners' complaints
concerned a perceived decline in air quality that they alleged
would result from an increase in area vehicular traffic attribu-
table to the development project. 5 The petitioners contended
that unless sufficient mitigating measures were undertaken,
the resulting carbon monoxide levels would exceed the maxi-
mum level permitted by the federal Clean Air Act. 6 The miti-
gating measures proposed by the UDC included adding an ad-
ditional "lay-by" lane to Eighth Avenue where it passes
through the project, the construction of a pedestrian walkway
leading to the Port Authority bus terminal, relocating a taxi
stand, and creating no-standing areas .3 The UDC stated that
28. Id. at 412, 494 N.E.2d at 433, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
29. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(5) (McKinney 1984).
30. Jackson, 67 N.Y.2d at 412, 494 N.E.2d at 433, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 413, 494 N.E.2d at 433, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
33. Id. at 413, 494 N.E.2d at 434, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
34. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., N.Y.L.J., Jun. 28, 1985, at 13,
col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County).
35. Id.
36. Id. The Court of Appeals decision that the UDC had proposed mitigating
measures to meet the Clean Air Act standard for acceptable carbon monoxide levels,
foreclosed the petitioners from litigating the same claim under a Clean Air Act citi-
zens suit. Wilder v. Thomas, 659 F. Supp. 1500, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
37. Jackson, N.Y. L. J., June 28, 1985, at 13, col. 4.
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these mitigating measures would speed the course of traffic
and thereby reduce the carbon monoxide concentration in the
area. 8 The petitioners challenged the EIS on the ground that
insufficient attention was given to the project's impact on
traffic congestion and air quality,3 9 and that certain back-
ground data underlying the UDC conclusions regarding air
pollution and traffic congestion were not disclosed."0
The New York supreme court stated that its scope of re-
view was circumscribed by the provisions of CPLR Article
78.' Citing Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning Board,42 the
supreme court defined this scope of review as requiring merely
to determine (1) whether UDC identified the relevant areas of
environmental concern, (2) took a "hard look" at them, and
(3) made a "reasoned" elaboration of the basis for its determi-
nation. "3 However, the court, citing precedent, broadened its
scope of review to require compliance not only with the letter
but also with the spirit of SEQRA.' 4
The court observed that the UDC's "roseate optimism"
with respect to the effect of the proposed mitigating measures
appeared to be largely misplaced. "5 It based this observation
on the fact that the implementation of the proposed mitigat-
ing measures depended largely upon governmental agencies
which the UDC does not control."' However, the court con-
cluded that it was in no position to substitute its judgment for
the UDC's judgment regarding the effectiveness of the miti-
gating measures. 7 The court found that since the dispute over
the type of model used in assessing traffic impact was a dis-
pute among experts, the court must defer to the UDC's judg-
38. Id.
39. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 426, 494
N.E.2d 429, 442, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 311 (1986).
40. Id. at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d 308.
41. Jackson, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13, col. 3.
42. 96 A.D.2d 986, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1983).
43. Jackson, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13, col. 3.
44. Id. (citing Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76
A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1980)).
45. Id. at col. 4.
46. Id. at cols. 4-5.
47. Id. at col. 5.
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ment that the measures were adequate.4 8 Based on this defer-
ence to the UDC, the court dismissed the Rosenthal
petitioners' claims concerning the impact of the project on the
area's traffic and air quality. 9
The Rosenthal petitioners also complained that the UDC
failed to disclose certain background data underlying its con-
clusions regarding air pollution and traffic congestion. 50 The
court summarily stated that if the petitioners' expert had re-
quested copies of documents and had not received them, the
proper forum for that dispute would be in a Freedom of Infor-
mation Law 51 proceeding.52
B. The Appellate Division Affirms
In establishing the applicable judicial standard of review,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, recognized that
as the instant proceedings were pursuant to CPLR Article
78,5' the UDC's determinations could only be overturned if
they were found to be arbitrary and capricious or unsupported
by substantial evidence. 4 The court noted that this standard
of review is based upon the general rule that courts should
defer to the exercise of reasonable discretion by administra-
tive agencies. Thus, the court is not permitted to determine
the merits of the project.5 The appellate division applied the
same standard of review utilized by the supreme court. It
found that the court must determine whether the agency has
complied with the applicable law, identified the relevant areas
of environmental concern, taken a "hard look" at them, and
made a reasonable elaboration of the basis for its
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 422, 494
N.E.2d 429, 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 308 (1986).
51. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 87 (McKinney 1988).
52. Jackson, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13, col. 4.
53. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1981).
54. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 307, 494
N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1st Dep't 1985).
55. Id. at 307, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03.
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determination."6
The appellate division affirmed the dismissal of the Ro-
senthal petitioners' claims regarding the level of attention
given to the project's impact on traffic congestion and air
quality. 57 In its review of the record, the court found that the
UDC had adopted a "worst case" analysis to develop a very
conservative model for traffic analysis and air quality assess-
ment. 8 In spite of the Rosenthal petitioners' claims to the
contrary, the court found that the computer model utilized by
the UDC to calculate automobile emissions was the most ap-
propriate model available at that time. 9 The court stated that
the UDC had studied the expected adverse impacts and then
proposed a multitude of mitigative measures which would not
only place the area within federal and city guidelines on car-
bon monoxide levels, but which might produce lower carbon
monoxide concentrations than currently exist.6" Therefore, the
appellate division concluded that the supreme court had cor-
rectly deferred to the UDC's judgment on this issue because,
in the view of the appellate division, the UDC had identified
the adverse traffic and air quality impacts, taken a hard ana-
lytical look at them, and proposed mitigative measures which,
it had a reasonable basis to conclude, would in fact minimize
those adverse effects. 1
In reviewing the supreme court's dismissal of the peti-
tioners' claim that the UDC had withheld background data,
the appellate division stated that the FEIS contained detailed
explanations of the methodology used to analyze the impacts
on traffic and air quality, and that no relevant materials were
hidden from the public's view. 62
56. Id. at 307-08, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
57. Id. at 310, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 310-11, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
62. Id. at 310, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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C. The Court of Appeals Also Affirms
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
courts' decisions regarding the Rosenthal petitioners' claim
that insufficient attention was given to the project's impact on
traffic congestion and air quality. The court of appeals
stated its agreement with the lower courts' conclusions that
"UDC identified the adverse traffic and air quality impacts,
took a hard analytical look at them and proposed mitigating
measures which, it had reasonable basis to conclude, would in
fact minimize those adverse effects. 64
The court of appeals gave considerable attention to the
Rosenthal petitioners' claim that the UDC failed to disclose
certain background data underlying its conclusions regarding
air pollution and traffic congestion. The court recognized that
although SEQRA does not explicitly address the extent to
which raw data must be disclosed, the regulations and the
statutory purposes provide guidance for the determination of
this issue.65 The regulations intend to limit the detail of the
EIS to no more than is appropriate for the proposed action. 6
On the other hand, the primary purpose of the EIS is the dis-
semination of information to the public and other public
agencies of the proposed action, 7 and this purpose is best
served by broad disclosure. 8 After balancing these conflicting
considerations, the court of appeals concluded that the speci-
ficity of the EIS regarding the UDC calculations of traffic and
air quality impacts was sufficient because it had allowed in-
formed consideration and comment on the issues.6
63. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 426, 494
N.E.2d 429, 442, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 311 (1986).
64. Id. (citing Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 311,
494 N.Y.S. 700, 704 (1st Dep't 1985)).
65. Id. at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
66. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.14(c) (1987).
67. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(4) (McKinney 1984).
68. Jackson, 67 N.Y.2d at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
69. Id. at 423, 494 N.E.2d at 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
1987]
9
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
IV. Analysis of Court Decisions
A. The Applicable Standard of Review
Both the supreme court and the appellate division recog-
nized that the applicable standard of review is that standard
of review prescribed by the CPLR Article 78.7" The appellate
division interpreted this standard of review as precluding a
court from overturning an agency's determination unless the
determination is found to be arbitrary and capricious or un-
supported by substantial evidence. 1 In evaluating the peti-
tioners' challenges to this standard of review, the appellate di-
vision used the "arbitrary and capricious" standard and the
"substantial evidence" standard almost interchangeably.
However, these standards are distinguishable and are to be
applied according to the type of regulatory action that re-
sulted in the agency determination.72
When an agency determination is challenged pursuant to
CPLR Article 78, the applicable standard of judicial review
depends on the manner by which the agency reached its de-
termination. If a determination was made as a result of a
hearing at which evidence was taken, it must be on the entire
record, supported by substantial evidence. 73 If an agency de-
termination results from a quasi-judicial hearing, the substan-
tial evidence standard should be used by a court.74 However,
where the agency determination is made without a hearing, or
where the hearing is discretionary or informational, as op-
posed to adjudicatory and evidentiary, the standard of review
is the arbitrary and capricious standard.75
The substantial evidence standard requires a more prob-
ing review of an agency's determination which results from a
70. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1981).
71. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 307, 494
N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (1st Dep't 1985).
72. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1981).
73. Id. § 7803(4).
74. Older v. Board of Education, 27 N.Y.2d 333, 337, 266 N.E.2d 812, 814, 318
N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1971).
75. Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 120
A.D.2d 166, 169, 508 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (3d Dep't 1986).
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quasi-judicial proceeding because the court has a more com-
plete record before it.76 Therefore, when the law requires a
hearing, it may be inferred that there is less latitude in the
exercise of discretion by the agency and the agency decision
must be more carefully justified by factual findings." When
the agency determination does not involve a hearing, the arbi-
trary and capricious standard serves as a judicial restraint on
the exercise of agency discretion. 8
The key element in determining the proper standard of
judicial review is whether or not an agency hearing is re-
quired. SEQRA provides that after the DEIS is filed, the
agency shall determine whether or not to conduct a public
hearing on the environmental impact of the proposed action.7
In determining whether or not to hold a hearing, the agency
shall consider:
the degree of interest in the action shown by the public or
involved agencies; whether substantive or significant envi-
ronmental issues have been raised; the adequacy of the
mitigation measures proposed and the consideration of al-
ternatives; and the extent to which a public hearing can
aid the agency decisionmaking process by providing a fo-
rum for, or an efficient mechanism for the collection, of
public comment."'
While SEQRA requires the agency to make a determination,
the actual decision of whether or not to hold a hearing is
purely discretionary with the agency. Furthermore, when an
agency has determined that a hearing is necessary because of
the significant environmental impact posed by the proposed
action, the hearing conducted is not adjudicatory or quasi-ju-
dicial, but informational.8 1 Therefore, judicial review of
agency determinations resulting from hearings pursuant to
76. Older, 27 N.Y.2d at 337, 266 N.E.2d at 814, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
77. Comment, Judicial Review, 52 St. John's L. Rev. 361, 371 (1978).
78. Id.
79. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(5) (McKinney 1984).
80. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.8(d) (1987).
81. Department of Envtl. Protection v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 120
A.D.2d 166, 169, 508 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (3d Dep't 1986).
1987]
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SEQRA should utilize the arbitrary and capricious standard
rather than the substantial evidence standard.In Jackson, the supreme court stated that the scope of its
review was merely to determine (1) whether UDC identified
the relevant areas of environmental concern, (2) took a "hard
look" at them, and (3) made a "reasoned" elaboration of the
basis for its determination.2 The establishment of this scope
of review can be traced to H.O.M.E.S. v. New York Urban
Development Corp.8 3 Based on this scope of review, the
H.O.M.E.S. court found the discretiofiary issuance of a nega-
tive declaration 84 by the UDC for the inclusion of a proposed
domed sports facility in an existing planned institutional dis-
trict was arbitrary and capricious. 5 Since the UDC determi-
nations being challenged in the Jackson case resulted from
discretionary hearings, the appropriate standard of review is
the arbitrary and capricious standard. As both Jackson and
H.O.M.E.S. involved the judicial review of actions within the
UDC's discretion, the scope of review utilized by the Jackson
court was appropriate to determine whether or not the UDC's
actions complied with SEQRA.
The appellate division, on the other hand, failed to dis-
tinguish between the arbitrary and capricious standard and
the substantial evidence standard in stating that the courts
will overturn an agency's determination only when it was arbi-
trary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence.86
This failure to distinguish between the standards of review is
further evidenced by the court's conclusion that the Rosenthal
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the UDC has acted
arbitrarily and capriciously or that the UDC has failed to sub-
stantiate its conclusions on any of the issues challenged. 7
82. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13,
col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County).
83. 69 A.D.2d 222, 232, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (4th Dep't 1979).
84. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.10(a) (1987). Negative declaration
is a written determination by a lead agency that the proposed action will not result in
any significant environmental effects. Id. § 617.2(y).
85. H.O.M.E.S., 69 A.D.2d at 233, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
86. Jackson v. New York Urban Dev. Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 307, 494 N.Y.S.2d
700, 708 (1st Dep't 1985).
87. Id. at 311, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
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B. The Courts' Factual Findings
In its decision, the supreme court detailed the UDC's pro-
posed measures to mitigate the traffic congestion and air qual-
ity impacts and observed that the UDC's "roseate optimism"
with respect to the effect of the proposed mitigating measures
appeared to be largely misplaced.8 8 Nevertheless, the court
upheld the UDC's determination that the proposed mitigating
measures would be effective. It held that deference to an
agency's determination resolving a dispute among experts was
appropriate under the arbitrary and capricious standard 8
Deference to an agency should not be granted to such an
extent that an agency's determination is upheld without the
support of factual evidence. Deference to an agency's determi-
nation resolving a dispute among experts is predicated upon
each side of the dispute being supported by a factual basis.
An agency's action is arbitrary when it is "without sound basis
in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts."'
The supreme court's observation, that the UDC's optimism
regarding the proposed mitigating measures was largely mis-
placed, raises a presumption that the UDC's determination
was not supported by factual evidence. The court's decision
does not otherwise discuss how the UDC's determination was
supported by the necessary factual evidence. In light of this
omission, the supreme court's deference to the UDC's deter-
mination seems to be misplaced.
The appellate division recognized that while deference
should be accorded to the reasonable discretion of administra-
tive agencies, the court is obliged to determine whether the
agency has complied with the applicable law, identified the
relevant areas of environmental concern, taken a "hard look"
at them, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its
determination. 1 A court will not overturn or overrule an
88. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13,
col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County).
89. Id. at col. 5.
90. Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974).
91. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 307-08, 494
N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (1st Dep't 1985).
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agency decision provided that the agency has taken this "hard
look."92 In applying this standard of review, the appellate di-
vision concluded that the UDC had performed the "hard
look" analysis of the environmental impact and arrived at a
well reasoned conclusion in approving the project." Based on
its review of the record, the appellate division described the
mitigating measures as extensive and numerous.94 This char-
acterization of the mitigating measures is inconsistent with
the supreme court's description of the proposed mitigating
measures, and that court's observation that the UDC's "rose-
ate optimism" with respect to the effect of the proposed miti-
gating measures appears largely misplaced.95 Nonetheless, the
appellate division held that the supreme court correctly de-
ferred to the judgment of the UDC. With respect to this is-
sue, the court of appeals agreed with the conclusions of the
lower courts. 7
These decisions seem contrary to the policy behind
SEQRA. The purpose of an EIS is to provide detailed infor-
mation as a basis for a decision on whether or not to under-
take or approve an action.98 The supreme court's observations
regarding the proposed mitigating measures, based on its re-
view of the UDC EIS, indicates a belief by the court that the
UDC's decision was without a sound basis in reason. An
agency action that is taken "without sound basis in reason
and is generally taken without regard to the facts" is
arbitrary.9
In reviewing the Rosenthal petitioners' claim that UDC
failed to disclose certain background data underlying its con-
clusions regarding air pollution and traffic congestion, the su-
92. Id. at 308, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (citing National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 310, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
95. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13,
col.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County).
96. Jackson, 110 A.D.2d at 311, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
97. Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp. 67 N.Y.2d 400, 426, 494 N.E.2d
429, 442, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 311 (1986).
98. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 1984).
99. Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 839 (1974).
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preme court held that the proper forum for the resolution of
this issue was a Freedom of Information Law proceeding. 100
The court's decision, without any supporting reasoning, indi-
cates that the supreme court failed to recognize that the pri-
mary purpose of the DEIS is the dissemination of the infor-
mation regarding the proposed action to the public and other
public agencies.101 The court of appeals, on the other hand,
recognized that this purpose is arguably best served by broad
disclosure. 02 However, the regulations provide that the EIS
should not contain more detail than is appropriate to the pro-
posed action and that highly technical material should be
summarized.10 3 Therefore, these limitations on the scope of an
EIS can be viewed as furthering the purpose of involving the
general public in the decision-making process. While not rec-
ognized by the court of appeals, excessive information or
highly technical material may dull the response of the general
public to the point of withdrawal from the process.
After balancing these conflicting considerations, the court
of appeals correctly concluded that the specificity of the EIS
regarding the UDC calculations of traffic and air quality im-
pacts was sufficient because it allowed informed consideration
and public comment on these issues.104 The court notes that
this conclusion is reinforced by a review of the comments on
the EIS actually received and the petitioners' claims on the
substantive issues of traffic congestion and air quality im-
pacts. 105 As the primary purpose of an EIS is to disseminate
information regarding the proposed action, the fact that the
Rosenthal petitioners were able to extensively criticize the
UDC treatment of traffic and air quality, justifies the court of
appeals' conclusion that the EIS was sufficient.
100. Jackson, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 13, col.4.
101. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(4) (McKinney 1984).
102. Jackson, 67 N.Y.2d at 422, 494 N.E.2d at 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
103. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.14(c) (1987).
104. Jackson, 67 N.Y.2d at 423, 494 N.E.2d at 439, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
105. Id. at 423, 494 N.E.2d at 440, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
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V. Conclusion
The purpose of an EIS is to provide detailed information
which forms the basis for a decision on whether or not to un-
dertake or approve an action.106 Therefore, in order to deter-
mine if an agency's decision is proper, the EIS will be re-
viewed to determine if there is a sufficient basis for the agency
decision. Judicial review of the sufficiency of an EIS involves a
two part process. First, the appropriate standard of review
must be established. Second, the EIS must be reviewed
against the applicable judicial standard to determine whether
the provided information is sufficient to justify the agency's
determination.
Since the decision to hold a public hearing on the EIS is
discretionary with the lead agency and informational rather
than adjudicative, the applicable judicial standard of review is
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 0 7 The court of appeals
used this standard in finding that the specificity of the EIS
regarding the UDC calculations of traffic and air quality im-
pacts was sufficient because it allowed informed consideration
and public comment on these issues. 0 8 Since the primary pur-
pose of an EIS is the dissemination of information regarding
the proposed action,"0 9 a sound basis for determining the suffi-
ciency of an EIS is whether the EIS has allowed informed
consideration and public comment on the proposed project.
The fact that the DEIS was sufficiently informative to al-
low the public to extensively criticize the UDC's treatment of
traffic and air quality was controlling in the Jackson court's
decision that the EIS was sufficient. "' As recognized in Jack-
son, a determination of whether or not the EIS has allowed
informed consideration and public comment involves a con-
sideration of the circumstances surrounding the review pro-
106. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 1984).
107. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803(3) (1981).
108. Jackson, 67 N.Y.2d at 423, 494 N.E.2d at 339, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
109. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8-0109(4) (McKinney 1984).
110. Jackson, 67 N.Y.2d at 423, 494 N.E.2d at 339, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
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cess. Therefore, the sufficiency of an EIS must be determined
on a case by case basis.
Steven F. Meyer
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